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  Laurent Stern

1.
Authors are reluctant to admit responsibility for the uncounted
ways their work is misunderstood. They prefer to
acknowledge the equally uncounted ways their work is
understood, even if they are surprised by some interpretations
they encounter. I am most grateful to the three participants of
this symposium — John Gibson, Paul Guyer, and Mary
Wiseman— for their work in understanding what I have
written. They succeeded admirably well. In studying their
contributions I became aware of their deep understanding of
what I have tried to achieve. Interpretations grounded on
understanding of the work which are at the same time
surprising for its author lead to an important goal of the
interpreting activity: the author’s self-examination and selfdiscovery. I am most grateful to John Gibson for organizing
both this symposium and its ancestor.
2. Reply to John Gibson
Without Gibson’s careful reading of my book, it would have
received some time ago its premature burial on the shelves of
our libraries. His work in thinking and writing about it kept it
alive; he knows it so well that at times I think of him as its
coauthor, but this is impossible, for he found out about it only
when the galley proofs became available. Still, when asked
what I contributed to our field, I would suggest that even if we
disagree on some issues, he has the best answers to this
question.
Gibson was especially successful in catching the spirit of my
insistence on the interpreter’s voice, and in making sense of
my critique of deep interpretation. I will discuss these topics
at greater length in my replies to Paul Guyer and Mary
Wiseman. Prior to these replies a remark will be useful.
In writing about deep interpretation, my aim was to defend
the views of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud against their
intellectual progeny. I had no quarrel with any extension of
common sense views of interpretation provided by the great
thinkers of deep interpretation. The focus of my objection was
an accidental feature of these extensions in the hands of some
modern day practitioners: the habit of disregarding significant
and important properties of what required interpretation and
transforming it into an interpreted object that was
prefabricated to show the power of a given view of deep
interpretation. In their hands, the extension of common sense
views provided by the three great thinkers turned into
ideologies that offered ready-made answers to all puzzling
questions. My critical remarks were primarily directed against
practitioners who could advertise for themselves under the
heading, “Have theory, will travel.”
In turning to problems in the practice of interpretation, Gibson
would like to examine how my views can be applied in the
interpretation of modernist art, especially poetry. A

preliminary remark is in order. Do we have only one concept
of interpretation that is applied in different fields? Or, do we
have many interpretive concepts that are dependent on the
topic that is being interpreted? In my writings I was guided by
the hypothesis that we have only one concept of
interpretation. If this is accepted, then we are committed to
the claim that this concept is used not only across different
fields and styles, but also within the same field at different
times. Interpretive problems of modernist poetry are not
radically different from classical poetry. This claim is
controversial, and it will be rejected by all critics who admit
that they are only sensitive to classical art, literature or music,
but are blind or deaf to their modern or modernist forms. We
are all partially insensible to some art forms, and we cannot
expect that the words and gestures of other critics who have a
less parochial view of their own fields will remove our
insensibility.
Even amateur criticism requires that we use words and
gestures in expressing our aesthetic delight. While I share
Gibson’s appreciation of Ashbery’s poetry, I dare not speak
about it. My prerequisite for talking about a poem is hearing it
when it is read aloud, or sounding it out in a language that I
can speak without a disturbing accent. In selecting lines of
another modern poet and contrasting it with a line of a
classicist poet, I expect to show how interpretive views can be
applied across the same field at different times.

Jean Racine, Phèdre, (1677), I, 1, lines 34-36:
Cet heureux temps n’est plus. Tout a changé de face,
Depuis que sur ces bords les dieux ont envoyé
La fille de Minos et de Pasiphaé.

Verlaine, Chanson d’automne (1866)
Les sanglots longs
Des violons
De l’automne
Blessent mon coeur
D’une langueur
Monotone.
Line 36 of Racine’s Phèdre has elicited more interpretive
commentary than any other line in the French canon;
Verlaine’s six lines are a close second. The names of the
unfamiliar mythical characters suggest that the reader consult
the relevant entries in a dictionary of classical mythology. Yet,
even if he knows that Minos was a reasonable judge in the
underworld, and Pasiphaé was at times ruled by her passions,
the content of that line does not explain why it was the target
of critical commentary for more than three centuries. The
content of that line is not more profound than Verlaine’s six
lines. So, what is it that draws attentions to these two
fragments of language? We must focus on the sound
structure of these language fragments if we wish to become
aware of their impact on the listener.
To be sure, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition

of aesthetic delight that we talk about its object. We start
talking about it when we are engaged in criticism or
interpretation. In talking we may succeed or fail in providing
ways of understanding that object and at the same time in
offering reasons for its appreciation. In the case of both
Racine’s line and Verlaine’s poem I would argue that the
listener or reader ought not expect a profound content that
waits to be revealed by a critic’s ad hoc theory. This is also a
controversial claim, and it will be rejected by critics who
require for a critical judgment the investigation of content prior
to the examination of the sound structure of a line or a poem.
Regardless of the side of the controversy the reader adopts,
after the initial steps we all proceed along parallel lines.
The procedures of critics who rely for interpretation on an
examination of the content of these language fragments are
far removed from my concerns with poetic language. These
critics are surely in a better position for speaking about their
own practices than others who do not share their views. Still,
they would agree that within the limits of the views they
defend, they provide the best available interpretation of what
they were interpreting, they have satisfied the factual and
normative constraints on interpreting, and all competent
interpreters agree with their interpretations.
Other critics who focus on the sound structure of poetry rather
than its paraphrased content refer to the contrasting sounds of
the second (fille) and seventh word (Pasiphaé) in Racine’s
Phèdre, line 36. All but the first word of that line occurs in the
characterization of Phèdre in the list of dramatis personae
(“Phèdre, femme de Thésée, fille de Minos et de Pasiphaé”).
Within this list, these words must be read for the biographical
information they contain about Phèdre; when read for its
content, this sequence of words is quite unremarkable. Yet if
the same words occurring on line 36 are read aloud and we
hear only the content of that line, then we are not listening to
poetry. The poetic power of that line comes across to the
listener only if he hears the contrast between the hard sound
in ‘fille’ and the soft ‘aé’ sound at the end of the seventh word.
The contrasting sounds of the two words reveal the same
information as an analysis of its content would have revealed.
Focusing on her characterization in the list of dramatis
personae, I read it as if it were Phèdre’s calling card; focusing
on line 36, I heard the contrasting sounds as a key to her
complex character. We fail to appreciate Racine’s poetic
powers if we say only that both the characterization and line
36 foreshadow what will happen in this tragedy. Even authors
of detective stories know how to leave hints about events that
will unfold in their stories. And it is not enough to marvel at
the great economy of means employed by Racine, who
succeeded in telling us first in six and later in seven words
what we must know to understand Phèdre’s character. We
start to appreciate poetry, and here I speak not only of
Racine, when we realize the decisive role of the sound
structure of language fragments in revealing what the content
is about.
Similarly, when we focus on the sound structure of Verlaine’s
poem, we become aware of the long nasal vowels that convey
gloom. When we listen to a classical, modern, or modernist

poem and find the key to that poem, we become aware that
most poems were written to be heard. Musicians can ‘hear’
music in their minds’ ears, and they need not sound it out for
criticizing a fragment of what they have ‘heard.’ In our
practices of interpreting poetry, there may not be anything
analogous to the musicians’ experience. I would argue that
most of us must rely on our biological ears for listening to
poetry. By repeatedly listening to the same fragments of
poetic language and sounding them out for our own pleasure,
we come to learn by heart some lines of a poem. While we
may remain silent about the cause of our aesthetic delight, if
we wish to speak with others about our experiences, we must
provide reasons for our interpretive decisions. What we say at
this point must satisfy from our viewpoint the same
constraints that must be satisfied by other critics who aim
solely at understanding the content of these language
fragments.
Interpreters may appeal to any extension of natural
interpretation when they interpret poetry, including some that
were created solely for the purpose of illuminating a line of a
modernist poet. They may call this extension a theory with or
without quotation marks, or they may not even give it a
name. Many of these extensions may suggest to a given
interpreter interesting remarks about a language fragment of
traditional, modern, or modernist poetry. Still, after offering
his remarks as an interpretation of that fragment, we are
entitled to ask: did he succeed in illuminating that fragment
or only in exemplifying an extension of natural interpretation?
Now if we judge that the interpreter has succeeded in both
tasks, his interpretation must be given a hearing and we must
be prepared to accept his interpretation. To be sure, we may
reject it for other reasons, but we cannot disqualify it because
it is grounded on an extension of natural interpretation.
3. Reply to Paul Guyer
Paul Guyer describes my book “as a work on the conditions for
the interpretation of acts in general and speech-acts in
particular.” The word “speech-acts” does not appear in this
book. Of course, Guyer knows well why I don’t speak about
speech-acts. He spells out the reason in the second paragraph
of his remarks: “Interpretation is needed only when the
speaker’s or agent’s meaning is not immediately obvious, so
Stern’s account of interpretation is not meant to be a
completely general account of understanding the intentions of
others.” Talking about speech-acts would be incompatible with
my model of interpretation. As long as we are clear on this
point, the critical reader must remain free to translate my
words into his preferred idiom.
My understanding of interpretation will become clearer, if we
focus on what Guyer calls my attack on deep interpretation,
which is, in his judgment, the animus of my work. For reasons
that will become evident, I must report on my perplexity upon
first reading this claim. I could not understand on what
grounds I stand accused of such a foul deed. I consider
myself an admirer of the work of the great thinkers of deep
interpretation: Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. So, why would
anyone want to accuse me of attacking deep interpretation?
Even for a moment I couldn’t accept that this was an off-the-

wall interpretation. (An example of such an interpretation is
that Michelangelo’s Man’s Fall in the Sistine Chapel was
created to serve as a landing surface for flying insects.) After
all, Paul Guyer, the interpreter of my work happens to be one
of the best philosophical interpreters of his generation. Still,
given my strong resistance to his understanding, my first
reaction was that his interpretation was a deep interpretation
of my views. However, for me this was not a live option. For
if I accept his interpretation as a deep interpretation, then at
the same time I admit not only my own lack of sincerity but
also open the door to questioning his sincerity. Why?
Authors may not be expert interpreters of their own books, but
they are at least competent interpreters. Now as a critic of my
book, Guyer expects that either all or some competent
interpreters will agree with his judgment. Given that as a
competent interpreter I disagree, he can expect only the
agreement of some competent interpreters. Accordingly, he
can no longer appeal to the Universalizability Principle; he can
appeal only to the Restrictive Principle. (Of course, he may
not want to appeal to any principle.) No doubt all interpreters
who agree with him are competent. But it was primarily my
resistance to his judgment that excludes from consideration
the claim that all competent interpreters agree with him. As
long as we recall the interpretive tradition from Shakespeare
to Freud and beyond, no great acumen is required for raising
here a question: isn’t the strength of my resistance a mark of
my insincerity?
At this stage my only choice was to label his interpretation an
off-the-wall interpretation or a surface interpretation in the
subjunctive mood. For the reason already mentioned, I have
excluded the first choice. The second choice did not seem
more promising. For if I admit that his interpretation is a
natural interpretation in the subjunctive mood, then at the
same time I concede that I would admit his interpretation, if I
had all his information at my disposal, and I would be sincere
and reasonable.
Let us pause here for a moment. Other details must be added
before the reader of these lines reaches a judgment in this
debate. Still, it can be seen that moral issues arise very
quickly in interpretive disagreements. The details added will
exemplify my views on the interpreting activity, and will enable
the reader to reach a judgment on the extent of our
agreement.
Of course, at any time while thinking about our interpretive
disagreement, I could say that Guyer did not get me right, and
this is all that needs to be said. It is easy to say this upon
encountering an off-the-wall interpretation of my work or an
interpretation that does not deserve serious discussion. But in
the context of this discussion, it is important to offer at least a
hypothesis: if he was mistaken, then why was he mistaken?
Either one or both of us may be at fault. Let us first exclude
some irrelevant interpretive alternatives.
Could it be that it is Guyer who is motivated by some
unavowed interest in an alternative view of interpretation of
which he is at least partially unaware? Note the reversal of
our situation. Before I wanted to defend myself against his
deep interpretation of my views, and now I offer a deep

interpretation of his views. Both deep interpretations lack an
essential element. Each of us would have to point to the
moral failings of the other in support of the claim that the
other is offering a deep interpretation. In political debates
each side suspects the other’s sincerity; of course, this
suspicion is often justified. In debates about matters of
religion, we often find ourselves in the position that we
attribute insincerity to our opponents; no doubt, often we have
good reasons for our views. But in our debate about deep
interpretation there are no reasons for such suspicion. Hence,
neither of us is free to argue that the other offers a deep
interpretation. So, what are my choices in judging his claim
that I have attacked deep interpretation?
Since I have excluded the other choices, I could admit that
Guyer offered a natural interpretation in the indicative mood:
all competent interpreters agree with his interpretation.
Alternatively, I could admit that it is no longer an
interpretation of my work that I attacked deep interpretation:
it is a fact. To be sure, I will resist either alternative. Still, it
was important to show that an interpretive disagreement can
easily turn into a discussion about the facts of the matter.
Interpretations are located between what I have called offthe-wall interpretations and facts. Within that space obviously
false claims gain entry, but also misinterpretations, deep
interpretations, adequate interpretations in the subjunctive or
indicative mood, and even interpretations that are candidates
of becoming at a later date obviously true claims. Deep
interpretations play a very important role within that space;
their defense against attack is at the center of my work.
Interpretive controversies are grounded on the possibility that
at least one of the opponents is mistaken. From at least one
participant’s viewpoint, we reach a satisfactory resolution of
the controversy if that participant comes to understand why he
was mistaken or why his opponent is now mistaken. Failing
such an outcome, each can only repeat that the other is
mistaken. In many cases this is the best that can be done.
Further inquiry into the reasons for a mistake that I have
made or my opponent is now making lead very quickly to
charges of deficient self-understanding or self-deception.
Such charges always have a moral dimension. It is at this
stage that the power and infirmity of deep interpretation can
be evaluated. First, we must clear up a point that creates an
obstacle to understanding.
According to Guyer, the real thrust of my “concept of deep
interpretation is that it is one to which the interpretee is
supposed to be, as it were, permanently resistant but in which
the interpreter nevertheless claims to be justified.” The word
“permanent” occurs only once in my book in another context;
“permanently” does not appear. If the permanent resistance
of the interpretee is understood as a defining characteristic of
deep interpretation, then my account is either false or
incoherent.
Suppose I am trying to find a reason for someone else’s
mistake. Even suggestions that sound innocent can lead to
deep interpretation. For example, I offer carelessness as a
reason for the mistake. When the reason I suggested meets
strong resistance and alternative explanations are deemed

insufficient, it may occur to me that deficient selfunderstanding is a reason for the resistance. Of course, either
one of us can be mistaken. But even if I am right, I would
mention the deficient self-understanding of another person
only if I am prepared to stand by the moral dimension of my
charge. Charges of deficient self-understanding or selfdeception always have a moral dimension. Bereft of such a
dimension, there is no point to deep interpretation. Our great
teachers of deep interpretation have taught us that every deep
interpretation of the words and deeds of another person ends
with the (often unspoken) concluding Rilkean insight: you
must change...!
If the interpretee’s permanent resistance were a defining
characteristic of deep interpretation, then the call for change
wouldn’t make sense. Also, Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche would
be reaching in their writings only the few—if there are any—
who do not need deep interpretation. And this is false. It is
part of the power of great theories of deep interpretation that
they are addressed to all. Another part of their power derives
from the fact that their interpretive methods have survived
critical scrutiny. Their survival is secured by their critics as
much as by their practitioners.
Praise for the power of deep interpretation must not hide an
infirmity that comes to the fore only in a discussion between
its practitioner and her interpretee. Contrary to Guyer, I hold
that the practitioner often is justified in arguing that the
interpretee “sincerely believes what he claims to believe but is
blamably mistaken in so doing.” Let us assume that the
practitioner is not mistaken and that she knows better than
the interpretee what he meant by his words and deeds. She
relies on a set of interconnected beliefs grounded on an
extension of natural or surface interpretation. By saying that
the interpretee is blamable, we admit that although the
interpretee was in a very good position to know what the
practitioner attributes to him, the fact that he did not know it
suggests his deficient self-knowledge. Call this deficiency selfdeception or call it by any other name, and if you prefer, don’t
call it by any name. You happen to be in excellent company
regardless of whether you affirm or deny the existence of the
phenomenon of self-deception. (The Humean Kant and the
Cartesian Sartre were on opposite sides on this issue.)
Important is only that the interpreter attribute a moral failing
to the interpretee.
Guyer suggests an alternative to my account. “But deep
interpretation might also be thought of as explanations of why
certain sorts of speakers have the intentions that they do, so
that it is not false that the speakers have those intentions, but
the fact of their having those intentions is to be explained in a
way that the speakers do not realize or recognize. In this
case, speakers would not need to be self-deceived about their
own intentions but would rather be ignorant of the explanation
of those intentions.” Confronted with this alternative, I must
ask: Can we attribute this interpretee’s ignorance to a
deficient self-knowledge and blame him for his moral failing?
If the answer is affirmative, then this case is not different from
other examples that call for deep interpretation; if it is
negative, then there is no reason for deep interpretation.

Except in a political or religious context, we are seldom in the
position of attributing deficient self-knowledge to another
person while we are engaged in a debate with him about what
he has said or done. Even if we are convinced that all
competent interpreters would agree with our judgment of the
interpretee while debating with the interpretee, and we are
entitled to appeal to the Universalizability Principle, we restrict
the scope of our judgment to some competent interpreters. It
is in this context that I located the insincerity of deep
interpretation: the deep interpreter relies on one principle
privately and on another publicly. This is a small but indelible
stain on our interpretive practices. In defending deep
interpretation, we must accept that insincerity is its price on
the rare occasions when we attribute deficient self-knowledge
to another person.
How often did the great thinkers of deep interpretation engage
their interpretees in a discussion about deficient selfknowledge? Hostile critics have argued that their views are
generalizations from few cases. Even if the critics are right
about the facts, e.g. about the very small number of patients
Freud saw during his long career, this is irrelevant in an
assessment of deep interpretation. For the power of deep
interpretation reveals itself, not in the quarrels between
practitioners and their critics, but in the work of interpretees in
their process of self-discovery. Practitioners of deep
interpretation are at their best when they rely on their
interpretees to work on their self-interpretation. In optimal
cases the self-interpretation will yield self-discovery.
Guyer charged me with attacking deep interpretation. I
replied that it is the defense of deep interpretation that is at
the center of my work. Who is right in this debate? Before
the reader decides on this issue, caution is in order. At least
four possibilities must be examined: one of us is right, both of
us are right, both of us are mistaken, the notion of being right
or mistaken is not applicable to this debate. It may be the
case that our conceptions of deep interpretation are so widely
divergent that while using the same words, we are talking
about different activities. Moreover, even if we exclude this
possibility, the reader must decide whether our disagreement
can be grounded on a sufficiently large area of agreement.
For even if we share sufficiently close conceptions of deep
interpretation, our disagreement may be only about the
application of our view of interpretation to the particular case
we are debating. What from Guyer’s understanding of my
work reveals an animus against deep interpretation, from my
own understanding exhibits a defense of deep interpretation.
Now, if the reader understands our debate as a discussion
about the facts of the matter, then only one of us can be
right. If it is a discussion about an interpretation of what I
have said, implied or suggested, then the fourth possibility
deserves to be examined. As a result of his examination, the
reader may find that he is confronting two irreconcilable
understandings of my work. By opting for the understanding
that seems to him most appropriate, he exemplifies the view
of interpretation defended in my work.
As a professional interpreter of Kant, Guyer has certainly a
clearer view of what Kant said or should have said than Kant’s

amateur followers. In writing about interpreting, I followed a
direction first indicated by Kant, but contributing to Kant
scholarship was not my aim. I may have missed the target of
Kant interpretation by an inch or a mile: this is irrelevant from
the viewpoint of understanding the interpreting activity. We
agree on a central point about Kant’s views: “For Kant, the
claim that if one has in fact made one’s own judgment of an
object correctly then others who also experience it under
optimal conditions can be expected to judge it the same way
... is the content of the judgment of taste, what is meant by
calling the object beautiful, not the premise or justification for
it.” For as Kant wrote: “The judgment of taste ... only
ascribes this consensus to everyone [es sinnt nur jedermann
diese Einstimmung an]....” I did not quote this passage, but I
alluded to it: “According to Kant, judgments of the beautiful
are uttered with a universal voice: in saying that a given
object is beautiful, I enter the claim that all other reasonable
persons would judge as I do; a judgment that agrees with
mine is imputed to them.” (p. 74)
I must add that I did not assert that universalizability is a
premise or a justification for every interpretive statement.
Guyer seems to fault me on this issue. After reexamining all
twenty-four occurrences of ‘premise,’ ‘justify,’ or ‘justification'
in my book, I could not find what I have contributed to his
misunderstanding. Since I did not explicitly deny the view
Guyer attributes to me, a translation into his preferred idiom
of what I said may have provided grounds for claiming that I
implied or suggested what I did not assert.
A full account of my approach to criticism in the arts or a
detailed exposition or critique of Kant’s views is not within the
scope of my book on interpreting. What is in its scope is a
discussion of our interpreting activity within certain limits.
Interpreting does not have a natural beginning or ending
point. If in our examination of interpreting we do not
arbitrarily assign a starting point for the interpreting activity,
then our notion of interpreting becomes too broad. I have
stipulated that interpreting starts when there is a need for an
interpretation, when we do not understand what is at issue
without further inquiry. There was no need to assign an end
point to interpreting. If my stipulation is accepted, then I
cannot provide a general account of speech-acts, or the
intentions behind the words and deeds of others. Also, my
understanding of what is inside and outside of an artwork will
be different from what is accepted by others.
According to Guyer, “all that is strictly internal to a poem is a
series of black marks on white paper that could be described
by a geometer or a series of sounds that could be described by
a phonologist.” If this is what you consider internal to a poem,
then it follows that “Any meaning the object has and thus
anything about it that is to be interpreted will in this sense
already involve something external to it....” What Guyer calls
internal to a poem is from my viewpoint as external to it as
the strings of ‘0’s and ‘1’s my computer is producing while I
am writing words of a natural language. What is described by
the phonologist or geometer is not a poem. To be sure,
without what can be described by them, the poem would not
exist; without the corresponding machine language, my writing
on a computer would not be preserved. This may be of some

importance for the ontologist, but from the viewpoint of the
interpreter it is irrelevant.
To be sure, phonologists can confirm recurring patterns in the
sound structure of a poem. Unless we hear these patterns
independently from the phonologist’s work, this will not
contribute to our interpretation of that poem. It is not enough
to recognize the long nasal vowels and soft l-sound in
Verlaine’s poem. These are ingredients that are easily
recognized. Similarly, food tasters can recognize the
ingredients of a dish, but this does not imply that they can
also evaluate that dish. The evaluation of a poem requires
that we bridge the gap between our recognizing its sound
structure and our verdict that it is a poem, a good poem or a
great poem. In bridging that gap we find what I mentioned
before as the key to Verlaine’s poem. Once we find that key,
we are able to derive the content of that poem from its sound
structure. It is precisely this key that poet-translators try to
find when translating a poem into another language.
4. Reply to Mary Wiseman
After offering in her own voice an excellent sum of my views
on interpreting, Wiseman suggests that my account of “the
points of view from which an interpreter can regard what was
said or done, her own or that of the speaker or agent or of any
rational person ... is curiously incomplete.” Since there is no
natural end to interpreting, and we can always add to our
interpretive commentary, any view of interpreting is
incomplete. Still, I was surprised to learn that I am charged
with this failing. In at least two contexts I wrote about
incompatible viewpoints in interpreting.
The first context is unproblematical, the second raises
important questions. Suppose I am confronted with a Nazi
who is a firm believer in the eliminationist policies adopted
against members of so-called “inferior races.” From the
viewpoint of all who share his views it is right—and maybe
even a duty—to exterminate as many Jews, Roma and Sinti as
possible. Now, it is fairly easy to show that not only is he
wrong, but also the view that he shares with others is wrong.
Their viewpoint is wrong and must be dismissed. For it
subdivides humanity into superior and inferior groups, and
destines the so-called inferiors to elimination or in a milder
form to slavery.
I will introduce the second context by an example. According
to the gossip among Philosophy graduate students of the
1950’s, Austin once gestured in the direction of a passing
colleague on the Berkeley campus, and said to his students
“that man is lying through his teeth.” The remark was
prompted by Austin’s failure to convince his colleague that we
see physical objects rather than sense-data. What motivated
Austin in doubting his colleague’s sincerity? The fact that his
colleague could not be persuaded by arguments contradicting
his views is insufficient for supporting the charge of
insincerity. There are incompatible viewpoints that do not
admit negotiations. In these cases, adopting the views of the
opposing side is not a live option. At issue between Austin
and his colleague was an undecidable philosophical problem.
Doubt about the sincerity of either side in such a debate
requires additional evidence.

Wiseman draws our attention to the fact that if we cannot
grasp what was said from the interpreter’s viewpoint, we may
be able to grasp it from the speaker’s viewpoint. She is quite
right, and this is precisely what we do when in the large
majority of cases we examine another person’s selfunderstanding and come to believe that it is sincere and in
accordance with facts. In these cases we are guided by his
self-understanding. “Such an interpretation is successful if the
interpreter’s understanding of the speaker’s words agrees with
the latter’s self-understanding.”(p. 46) This will not be of help
in the above two contexts, for the interpreter may be unable
to grasp what was said from any viewpoint. Let us focus on
the first context. I have repeated what was said about inferior
races, and this may even persuade you that I have some
understanding of what I said — but, is this really the case?
Since I am a firm believer in the moral unity of mankind, I find
the very idea that there are superior or inferior groups of
human beings incoherent. At other times and other places
even some philosophers—e.g., Plato and Aristotle—made
sense of this idea, but this does not imply that we can make
sense of it.[1]
There is an allusion to phenomenalism in the second context.
Austin’s colleague believed that he saw sense-data, and
physical objects were nothing but logical constructs of sensedata, while philosophers sympathetic to Austin’s views held
that they saw physical objects and sense-data were nothing
but philosophers’ day-mares. The suggestion that each side
must understand the other from the other’s viewpoint is not
helpful in these cases. But beyond these admittedly rare
contexts, is the advice that we try to understand the other
from his viewpoint, when I do not succeed from mine useful
for solving interpretive problems?
We cannot rely on another person’s deficient selfunderstanding. In these cases the interpretee has only
psychological, but not epistemic access to his own words and
deeds. “For example, if a child complains ‘I have a pain in my
hair’, we cannot expect to understand him as he understands
himself. The self-understanding of the speaker or agent may
be insufficient, his vocabulary limited, his judgment clouded.
In these cases we set aside the speaker’s self-understanding,
and we substitute an interpretation of his words that accords
with facts known to the interpreter.” (p. 47) At one time in our
remote past, we have had similar complaints as the child in
my example, but this does not help us to understand this
child’s complaint. By setting aside this child’s selfunderstanding and replacing it by facts about the child and his
circumstances, we can provide an interpretation of what he
said.
Attributing to the speaker what by our own lights is the
speaker’s viewpoint, and adopting his viewpoint for our
interpretation will not be helpful. (Note that even in this case
interpreting starts from the interpreter’s viewpoint.) We can
always repeat what the speaker has said, but when we
paraphrase his sentences, are we sure that we understand
him? No doubt, interpreters may be mistaken about some
facts that are important for understanding of what was said,
they may be insufficiently educated, and they may suffer from
various infirmities that prevent their understanding and

appreciation of what was said or done. The tone-deaf to
music and the unmusical to religion risk ridicule even as
amateur interpreters in these fields. Still, in cases when no
agreement can be established between a writer and his
competent interpreter, we must be prepared for the possibility
that the writer’s claims are either false or incoherent.
Aestheticians are not professional critics, yet all three
contributors to this conversation challenge me to expand on
my remarks on criticism in the arts. John Gibson asked for a
suggestion about the reading of modernist poetry; I believe I
answered his query, provided that it is understood that I
spoke with the voice of an amateur.
Paul Guyer challenged the notion of the best available
interpretation in the arts from a viewpoint that is incompatible
with mine; while I believe he is mistaken, readers who adopt
his viewpoint of what is internal and external to an artwork
may agree with him, and judge that I am mistaken. Also, he
faults me for not explaining why an amateur critic need not
search for the best available interpretation. I failed to do so,
for I believed that my point will be understood without further
explanation. Within our interpretive practices, professionals
have a duty to learn about the contributions of their
colleagues; amateurs are entitled to plead ignorance of the
professionals’ work. E.g., professional critics may provide a
better interpretation of Racine’s or Verlaine’s fragments of
language than what I have offered. Yet, as an amateur I am
entitled to hold on to my interpretation, no matter what the
professionals have decided.
Finally, Mary Wiseman suggests in the context of her
discussion of a de Kooning painting that “the viewer has to
make a case for the sets of intentions the painting seems to
her to fulfill. Stern would say that the set for which the best
case can be made is the best interpretation of the work. Given
different evaluative criteria, different interpretations might
count as the best.” She got me right. Among the many other
topics where she is right, I would like to draw attention to a
deeper problem that she raises.
When in my student days in the early 1950’s I first formulated
my interpretation of the two language fragments, I was as
ignorant as Racine or Verlaine about the phonological studies
of poetic language. When in the 1990’s I became acquainted
with some of the scientific literature on the subject—and
especially with the work of the Hungarian linguist Iván Fónagy
—it was easy to see that my interpretation did not contain
anything original. Due to progress in the sciences, what were
at one time interpretations became facts. While I did not
know it, they were already facts at the time when I first
formulated my interpretations.
I must report on another advance in the sciences. I repeated
in this paper what I said in 2008 in the symposium preceding
this conversation “most poems were written to be heard,” but
this time I added that “most of us must rely on our biological
ears for listening to poetry.” At that time I relied on
impressions gathered from poets and from the practice of
habitual readers of poetry. Now I am relying on recent
advances in the neurobiology of reading, and I am inclined to
believe that there is sufficient scientific evidence for my claim.

Relying on memory, I claimed that I arrived at my own
interpretation of the two language fragments. Do I really
know that I wasn’t influenced by others who were acquainted
with the scientific studies of poetic language? I cannot know
that. Hence, it is possible that even at the time when I first
formulated my interpretations, I merely engaged in a futile
exercise ordinarily compared to reinventing the wheel.
Similarly, do I now know that I wasn’t influenced by others
who knew about recent work in neurobiology, when I
confidently wrote that “most poems were written to be
heard"? My answer is negative. So, Wiseman is right, “Let
the interpreter speak in her own voice and not a borrowed
one, and let the object of her interpretation be itself and not a
mere projection of her memories and desires, beliefs and
doubts, longings and dreams.”   
5. Envoy  
Within the limited space available, I could not reply to all
criticisms of my views. Their defense was not my primary
aim. In a profession that thrives on disagreement,
professional courtesy is expressed by entering our caveat
against another philosopher’s conclusions, or by reaching his
conclusions while rejecting his premises. John Gibson, Paul
Guyer, and Mary Wiseman offered what for each of them was
the best available interpretation of their respective reading of
my book. They have done tremendous work in trying to
understand my views and in formulating their critique. For this
I am most grateful. They have grounds for demanding the
agreement of others, for each of them has satisfied the
normative and factual constraints on interpreting. The fact
that they do not agree with each other or with me does not
diminish their achievements or the importance of their
contributions to the debate. For it is precisely such
disagreement that makes thinking and writing about
interpreting valuable.
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Endnotes
[1] For further details, see the remarks about attitudes
towards slavery in my book, pp. 84-85 and 168-186.

